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Abstract
Recent literature in experimental philosophy has postulated the existence of the 
abstract/concrete paradox (ACP): the tendency to activate inconsistent intuitions 
(and generate inconsistent judgment) depending on whether a problem to be ana-
lyzed is framed in abstract terms or is described as a concrete case. One recent study 
supports the thesis that this effect influences judicial decision-making, including 
decision-making by professional judges, in areas such as interpretation of constitu-
tional principles and application of clear-cut rules. Here, following the existing liter-
ature in legal theory, we argue that the susceptibility to such an effect might depend 
on whether decision-makers operate in a legal system characterized by the formalist 
or particularist approach to legal interpretation, with formalist systems being less 
susceptible to the effect. To test this hypothesis, we compare the results of experi-
mental studies on ACP run on samples from two countries differing in legal culture: 
Poland and Brazil. The lack of significant differences between those results (also for 
professional legal decision-makers) suggests that ACP is a robust effect in the legal 
context.
Keywords Experimental jurisprudence · Abstract/concrete paradox · Identifiability 
effect · Judicialdecision-making · Formalism
 * Piotr Bystranowski 
 piotr.bystranowski@uj.edu.pl
1 Institute of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, 
Poland
2 Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland
3 Faculty of Law and Administration, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
4 Department of Philosophy, University of Granada, Granada, Spain
5 Department of Law, Pontifical University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
 P. Bystranowski et al.
1 3
1 Introduction
Recent work in experimental jurisprudence argues that a psychological effect 
termed the abstract/concrete paradox (ACP) may influence judicial decisions 
[1]. Specifically, experimental subjects, including legal professionals, endorse 
certain abstract principles that they tend to violate in practice—i.e. when decid-
ing concrete cases [2]. In a series of experiments, participants tended to oppose 
certain judicial decisions when facing a legal problem framed in abstract terms 
but favored the same decisions when applied to specific cases described in detail. 
This difference appeared to be tied to participants’ feelings of empathy in the 
concrete cases (but not the abstract cases), and was also observed among profes-
sional judges. Lastly, when invited to simultaneously reflect upon both abstract 
principles and their corresponding applications to concrete cases, legally-trained 
participants preferred to deliver consistent judgments across abstract-concrete 
pairs.
However, a cursory glance at the legal scholarship reveals that cultures vary 
widely in the extent to which they endorse or condone discretion in the appli-
cation of legal rules to specific cases: Some legal traditions view particularist 
reasoning as a useful tool amidst the complexity of judicial decision-making, 
while formalist schools favor a regimented adherence to the letter of the law. As a 
result, formalists may view the documented disparity between abstract principles 
and concrete decisions as flawed in ways in which particularists do not.
We then elaborate on the two predominant strategies of legal interpretation, i.e. 
formalism and particularism, and suggest that jurisdictions may differ substan-
tially in the extent to which they inculcate these approaches to judicial decision-
making. Furthermore, as advanced by some of its proponents, only the formalist 
approach can insulate legal decision-makers from certain psychological effects, 
such as ACP, which jeopardize the consistency of legal reasoning. Next, we draw 
on evidence to suggest that Brazil, where Struchiner and colleagues’ studies were 
conducted, evinces an exceptionally particularist legal tradition [2]. This raises 
the suspicion that ACP in legal contexts is a peculiarity of particularist cultures, 
and does not generalize to jurisdictions with a stronger formalist tradition. In the 
next section, we provide evidence that Poland is one such notably formalist juris-
diction. To corroborate our conjecture about cultural differences in the prevail-
ing legal tradition, we develop a scale of adjudication styles and demonstrate that 
legal scholars (N = 133) perceive the Polish and Brazilian judiciaries as charac-
teristically formalist and non-formalist, respectively (Study I).
Having established that countries differ in their tendency toward formalist ver-
sus particularist adjudication, we then ask the key question of our study: Does 
ACP arise equally in formalist legal cultures? If Polish legal professionals were 
to reveal substantially weaker discrepancies between their abstract and concrete 
judgments (than did their Brazilian counterparts), this could certify the role 
of formalist approaches to judicial decision-making. Specifically, such a result 
would lend empirical support to the claim that formalist training enables judges 
to override modes of intuitive legal decision-making. In the final sections, we 
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describe the methods and results of this comparative study (Study II). To our sur-
prise, we found that ACP emerges equally in a formalist legal culture. That is, 
although the Polish legal culture encourages a literal application of legal rules 
and discourages inconsistency between rules and their concrete applications, 
these inconsistencies nevertheless emerge.
Before turning to our empirical studies, in the following section, we provide an 
overview of empirical research characterizing ACP, and a closely related phenom-
enon, the identifiability effect (IE), paying particular attention to their manifestation 
in judicial decision-making contexts.
2  The Psychology of Abstraction and Concreteness
2.1  The Abstract/Concrete Paradox
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong coined the term abstract/concrete paradox (ACP) in 
response to what he saw as an emerging pattern in studies by experimental philoso-
phers: When asked philosophical questions (such as whether determinism precludes 
free will), participants provide strikingly different answers depending on the degree 
of “concreteness” with which the problem is described [1]. This, according to Sin-
nott-Armstrong, indicates that people have two types of intuitions, concrete and 
abstract, activated in different contexts [1].
Many philosophical controversies and paradoxes might be explained by the psy-
chological conflict between these two intuitions. For instance, Nichols and Knobe 
showed that people experience contrasting intuitions regarding the compatibility 
between determinism and moral responsibility in abstract versus concrete contexts 
[3]: In short, people believe that agents in a deterministic universe can be held 
morally responsible when considering a concrete case, but not when reasoning 
abstractly. Convergent results have been obtained in a number of subsequent stud-
ies [4]. Some of these studies [5, 6] have been successfully replicated by Cova and 
colleagues in a multi-lab initiative to estimate the reproducibility of experimental 
philosophy [7].
The precise features of concreteness that influence respondents’ reactions are thus 
far poorly understood. Sinnott-Armstrong admitted that “[f]or now, the dichotomy 
between abstract and concrete will have to remain inspecific,” [1] while Mandel-
baum and Ripley list some examples of what concreteness might amount to: describ-
ing an action that had previously been left undescribed in greater detail; considering 
a particular case instead of a general phenomenon; asking about an action happening 
in our actual world rather than an alternate, or hypothetical, universe [8].
Theories of ACP can be classified as either affective or cognitive [8]. Accord-
ing to affective theories, concrete descriptions often elicit strong affective reactions, 
both negative (e.g., moral outrage against the perpetrator) and positive (empathy 
towards the victim), whereas abstract vignettes are affectively neutral or mute [3, 
9, 10]. On the other hand, cognitive theories argue that different types of cognitive 
processes are used to evaluate each case: One explanation of this kind, the separate 
capacities hypothesis, refers to episodic memory and semantic memory [1]. While 
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abstract cognition is processed through semantic memory, assessments of concrete 
behavior depend to a greater extent on episodic memory.
2.2  Identifiability Effect
ACP seems to be closely related to a widely-documented phenomenon in psychol-
ogy and economics: the identifiability effect (IE), that is, the tendency for people to 
react more strongly (in either a generous or punitive way) to identified rather than 
unidentified individuals [11]. In one of the earliest experimental demonstrations of 
IE, inconsequential pieces of identifying information (e.g., a first name, a portrait, or 
even just a random ID number) consistently increased monetary donations to some-
one in need [12, 13]. Similar results have been obtained in the context of other types 
of decisions potentially benefiting third parties (e.g., in laboratory dictator games, 
see [14, 15]). Later studies revealed similar effects for detrimental outcomes involv-
ing blameworthy agents: Identifiability decreases the willingness to help, and/or 
increases the willingness to punish, individuals perceived as guilty of a blamewor-
thy act [14, 16]. Thus, there is an intuitive parallel between the experimental effects 
of identifiability and concreteness, IE and ACP, but also two noteworthy differences 
which we would like to briefly highlight.
First, philosophers who have grappled with ACP have typically remained agnos-
tic with regard to the relative normative value of abstract or concrete intuitions. 
Meanwhile, empirical research on IE is generally interpreted through a particular 
normative lens: It is often assumed that identifiability alone lacks any normative sig-
nificance (but see [17–19]) and that IE yields a suboptimal allocation of resources 
by devaluing unidentified (or even unidentifiable) individuals [20] and/or statistical 
lives (e.g., preventive programs in healthcare [21]).
Another feature distinguishing the body of evidence on IE from that of ACP is 
the greater agreement regarding the psychological underpinnings of the effect: It is 
widely understood that IE is caused by affective reactions since identified individu-
als elicit stronger empathic reactions such as sympathy, compassion, or distress [12, 
13] and also greater aversive emotions [3].
Thus, although conceptually connected, IE and ACP have been developed mostly 
in parallel. Nonetheless, IE is arguably a special case of ACP in which the differ-
ences between the levels of abstraction boil down to how thoroughly target individu-
als are identified.
3  Abstract/Concrete Effects in Legal Reasoning
Numerous studies have documented ACP and IE in processes of moral evaluation, 
shaping theories of moral decision-making. Given the overlap between moral and 
legal decision-making, one might expect that the effects of concreteness and identifi-
ability emerge in judicial decision-making as well. After all, mounting evidence in 
empirical legal studies shows that professional lawyers and judges, whether in the 
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lab or in the field, are prone to many of the same biases that pervade laypeople’s 
reasoning (see [22, 23]).
If ACP and IE were to play a role in the legal process, there would be arguably 
detrimental effects: increased discrepancies between ex ante and ex post modes of 
regulation (e.g., regulation through legislation and adjudication, respectively [24]), 
additional legal uncertainty, the possibility of inefficient legally-determined alloca-
tion of resources, to name a few. However, the breadth of evidence on this question 
remains limited.
In a legally relevant study often cited in the literature on ACP the goal was to 
elicit ordinary people’s views regarding the justification of state-imposed punish-
ment [25]. When asked in the abstract, participants appeared to take both the deter-
rence theory and retributivism as desirable philosophical foundations of criminal 
law. However, when those same participants considered a concrete case and were 
asked to decide on the magnitude of punishment, they turned out to be driven almost 
exclusively by retributive motives: Participants’ punishment decisions were quite 
sensitive to the factors that matter according to retributivism (e.g., the seriousness 
of the offence, or the presence of mitigating factors) while remaining largely insensi-
tive to the considerations that should decide punishment from the point of view of 
deterrence (such as the probability of apprehension, or whether the trial would be 
publicized and deter future crime).
The only study explicitly analyzing the role of IE in legal decision-making to 
date was presented by Lewinsohn-Zamir, Ritov, and Kogut [11]. Undergraduate 
participants were presented with a number of civil disputes and in each case were 
to choose one remedy from a menu of five options (ordered from the most lenient 
to the most onerous to the injurer). Subjects were randomly assigned to be either 
policy-makers (reading an abstract, hypothetical description of a case and deciding 
on remedies to be applied to future cases of this type) or decision-makers (reading 
a detailed description, including the names of the parties, of a particular case to be 
decided). Consistently, decision-makers chose remedies more lenient to the injurer 
than did policy-makers—suggesting that, in this particular context of civil disputes, 
IE favored the defendant. In a series of experiments conducted on professional 
judges, Wistrich and colleagues showed that manipulating legally irrelevant char-
acteristics of defendants can shape empathetic responses and, in turn, affect partici-
pants’ interpretation of abstract legal rules [26]. One of the experiments found that 
perceptions of a rule change when a case is presented as a class action (affecting a 
large and unidentified group of people) versus as an individual lawsuit—arguably an 
instance of IE. In line with the affective theories that prevail in the IE literature, the 
authors ascribe the effects to differences in emotional responses towards the defend-
ants. Relatedly, Spamann and Klöhn conducted an experiment in which they asked 
professional judges to apply a precedent, and found that sympathy/antipathy towards 
the particular defendant impacted the way the law was interpreted and applied [27].
However, the most thorough study on the operation of ACP (with a strong IE 
component) in judicial decision-making was described by Struchiner and col-
leagues [2]. The authors emphasize two areas of legal reasoning that might be 
particularly susceptible to ACP. The first is the application of under-determined, 
morally-charged legal principles (often present in constitutional provisions), whose 
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interpretation regarding a particular case may be controversial. The particular exam-
ple used by these authors is the constitutional principle of the protection of human 
dignity. At least in some contexts this principle is subject to alternative interpre-
tations: (1) an autonomy-based or libertarian reading, according to which human 
dignity requires the state to respect the personal choices that citizens freely make; 
and (2) a paternalistic reading, according to which a positive ideal of human dignity 
may on occasion necessitate state intervention—namely, to protect citizens from 
self-harm. The authors hypothesized that subjects would favor the paternalistic view 
in concrete cases, but the libertarian view when thinking abstractly.
Struchiner and colleagues also investigated the application of clear-cut legal 
rules [2]. Unlike morally-charged principles, clear-cut legal rules can be applied 
almost mechanically to a vast class of cases. However, the authors hypothesized that 
the tendency to adopt a literal interpretation of rules would diminish in concrete 
cases. In particular cases, decision-makers are arguably more likely to seek a fair 
solution or otherwise rely on the background justification of the rule.
For each of the scenarios (some dealing with morally-charged principles and 
others dealing with clear-cut rules), three levels of abstraction were devised: high 
(a hypothetical case described in a general manner), medium (a particular case 
described in detail, although without any proper names, individuation without iden-
tifiability), and low (a particular case described in detail, including proper names of 
parties, their cities of origin, etc., individuation with identifiability). It is worth not-
ing that the medium and low levels of abstraction differ only in legally and morally 
irrelevant details (e.g., proper names). Thus, the comparison between these condi-
tions resembles the research paradigm employed in studies on IE.
Struchiner and colleagues obtained substantial support for their hypotheses: both 
the interpretation of the principle of human dignity and the literal application of 
clear-cut rules depended on the level of abstraction with which cases were described 
[2]. The data collected in their study are interesting for two more reasons. First, 
subjects were asked to complete parts of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index ques-
tionnaire, thus capturing individual differences in cognitive (perspective-taking) 
and affective (empathic concern) empathy [28]. Echoing previous findings, affec-
tive but not cognitive empathy predicted subjects’ responses: In particular, highly 
empathic individuals were most susceptible to the manipulation of abstraction ver-
sus concreteness.
Second, the authors conducted their study on subjects that varied dramatically 
in their legal experience: from laypeople, through law students, to judges. If legal 
education and experience mitigate the effects of ACP and IE in legal contexts, we 
would expect reduced effects among legally-trained participants. To the contrary, 
even experienced lawyers were more particularist when assessing concrete cases 
(i.e., more likely to disregard the rule’s literal formulation), in much the same way as 
laypeople.
Even so, one may wonder whether cultural dimensions, legal or otherwise, under-
lie particularist reactions to concrete cases of perceived injustice. To take one exam-
ple, cultural differences in compliance with social norms and intolerance for deviant 
behavior [29, 30], might be associated with degrees of flexibility in the application 
of legal rules. In a focal study on the topic, Gelfand and colleagues used the concept 
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of tight cultures (cultures that enforce rigid norms and exhibit intolerance of devi-
ant behavior) and loose cultures (with more flexible social norms and greater tol-
erance of deviant behavior) [29]. Those notions were subsequently operationalized 
and examined in a cross-cultural study involving 33 countries, including Poland and 
Brazil. As a higher score on the tightness scale suggests a society is characterized 
by strong adherence to social norms, it stands to reason that such a society might 
also favor the literal and steadfast application of legal rules (implying also a lower 
propensity to ACP in legal decision-making). Gelfand and colleagues’ study found 
Brazil to be on the lower end of the tightness dimension [29]. If ACP effects arise 
from this general flexibility toward rules, we would expect them to be comparably 
weaker among nations higher in tightness.
Alternately, these effects may emerge from the predominant approaches to legal 
adjudication. In particular, Brazilian legal culture is largely influenced by the neo-
constitutionalist philosophy of legal interpretation—a philosophy that emphasizes 
a particularist application of law, and relies heavily on constitutional principles and 
fundamental rights as articulated in the natural law tradition [31].
Thus, our study sought to assess whether the results obtained by Struchiner and 
colleagues replicate in a formalist legal culture with a strong preference for the lit-
eral interpretation of legal provisions—namely, Poland [2]. In the following section, 
we describe formalism as a philosophy of adjudication and elaborate on the Polish 
and Brazilian legal cultures.
4  Judicial Formalism and Legal Culture
4.1  Particularist Brazil
Judicial decision-making in Brazil is markedly particularist, as evidenced by exist-
ing legal scholarship, as well as by the public record on the beliefs and attitudes of 
Brazilian judges. Since the adoption of Brazil’s current Constitution in 1988, schol-
arly discourse has overtly advocated the adoption of morally charged decision-mak-
ing methods in law. For example, Bodin de Moraes argues that:
The inclusion of fundamental rights and of the protection of human dignity in 
positive law, present in these constitutional texts [articles of the 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution], however, only became decisively significant after the neuralgic 
foundations of the contemporary legal paradigm was changed, i.e., after the 
normative force of the Constitution was recognized. The legal system’s open-
ing is recognized, in this way, inside positive law itself, for in its dynamic it 
allows, through the interpretative process, the resource—always argumenta-
tive—to (moral) values [32].
This is but one instance of the influential academic movement which defends the 
idea that even the traditionally more formalist disciplines regulated by the Civil 
Code should be interpreted through the morally loaded lens of the Constitution. The 
movement’s discourse is openly anti-formalist, favoring an all-things-considered 
resolution of each specific case over a literal interpretation of the rule’s text. In the 
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words of a critical observer, it was “undeniably a successful movement […]. [T]he 
influence of private constitutional discourse is increasingly noted on Brazil’s doc-
trine and case law since its introduction in the academic scene over twenty years 
ago” [33].
A testament to the movement’s success is the degree of particularism present 
in rulings and legal opinions issued by Brazil’s top judges. Take for instance Jus-
tice Luiz Fux, a Supreme Federal Court (SFC) justice. Before being appointed to 
SFC, Justice Fux was a member of Brazil’s second highest court, Superior Court 
of Justice, where he became famous for delivering morally loaded opinions. In one 
case where he decided to bypass the text of a local rule restricting publicly-funded 
treatment options for a rare disease, Justice Fux justified his choice in the following 
terms:
I am a persevering defender of human dignity, of the values immanent to 
human life and hope. I believe that’s our daily task as judges (…) and in doubt, 
we must side with this citizen’s hope to be cured at a more advanced [medical] 
center. […] once again, whenever torn between the dictates of the law and the 
demands of justice, I’ll opt for the solution that I consider to be more just.1
Fux was not reproached by the legal community for his disregard for the text of 
the most applicable rule, but rather praised for it, ultimately getting promoted to the 
highest court in Brazil. He has not changed his mind either. In 2016, in interview to 
a project documenting the history of STF, justice Fux said the following regarding 
judicial decision-making:
Today’s Constitution […] purports to indicate that all activities pursued by the 
State’s powers must be ethical, moral. Thus, all of this does not only guide 
those who act on the legal arena, but also those who apply the law. Legal deci-
sion-makers will render a decision and will have to make it as close as they 
can to the demands of ethics and legitimacy. I am used to saying the following: 
Justice is not something you learn, justice is something you feel. We know 
what is fair and what is not fair [34].
Moreover, Fux’s approach to legal interpretation is representative of many, if not 
most, of his colleagues on the bench. For example, Luis Roberto Barroso, another 
justice at STF, has a similar trajectory of anti-formalism [35]. For some of the most 
famous instances of particularistic decision-making in the Brazilian Supreme Court, 
see ADO 26, ADPF 132 (where Barroso was still a lawyer arguing the case before 
the court), AP 937.
Evidence from some academic articles and explicit attitudes of justices sitting on 
the country’s most important courts offers anecdotal support for our claim regarding 
Brazilian legal culture. However, a recent survey of a nation-wide sample of pro-
fessional judges provides some more systematic evidence of Brazilian particularism 
[36]. Parts of the study shed light on judges’ views about legal decision-making. For 
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instance, 57.9% of first-instance judges (N = 2519) and 44.8% of appellate judges 
(N = 313) disagreed with the statement that “The judge should prioritize the text of 
statutes over constitutional principles”, clearly expressing a preference for standards 
over rules. In a similar vein, 51.8% of first-instance judges (N = 2763) and 51.3% of 
appellate judges (N = 357) expressed that they should be able to disregard Supreme 
Court precedents. Finally, 89.4% of first-instance judges (N = 2519) and 91% of 
appellate judges (N = 313) agreed that judges can use constitutional principles to 
compel other powers to act on matters of public health, education and security.
Those results show that the wide population of Brazilian judges has followed the 
legal academia and top justices in their particularist philosophy. Brazilian academ-
ics and judges are forthcoming in their distrust of formalism and their praise for the 
use of morality in legal decision-making. Moreover, it is plausible that this overall 
stance might be relevant in contextualizing the effects of cognitive biases in Brazil-
ian legal decision-making.
4.2  Formalism as a Judicial Interpretive Strategy
Formalism provides an alternative to particularism in legal adjudication. As char-
acterized in one of the definitions offered by Frederick Schauer, formalism “is the 
practice (…) of following (…) the plain meaning of the words of the document in 
the face of plausible arguments for doing otherwise” [37]. This definition empha-
sizes two constitutive elements of formalism as a judicial interpretive strategy, 
both of them often stressed in the legal literature, that is, its reliance on the text 
of relevant law (textualism) and the minimization of extralegal sources of law in 
the process [38]. Those two elements combined imply that, for a formalist, decid-
ing a particular case on the basis of literal application of a relevant legal rule (at 
least as long as it communicates plain meaning) is preferable to considering any 
wider range of factors [38]. As a result, formalism focuses on the locally applica-
ble rules (most narrowly pertaining to the given situation) as a basis of adjudication 
(Although systemic interpretation of legal texts is also formalist, it should only play 
a secondary role [38]). In other words, formalism is assumed to drastically limit the 
set of factors relevant to deciding a particular case, excluding from consideration 
(or at least decreasing the relevance of) factors that might be deemed legitimate and 
relevant under other normative theories of adjudication. Among those other factors, 
most notable are the objective (background justification, rationale) of a given rule. 
Another group of possible factors would include general principles to be directly 
applied to the case at hand: general legal or constitutional principles, values derived 
from political ideology, religion, morality, the idea of justice or efficiency, etc.
What is the reason behind defining the catalogue of legitimate reasons for judi-
cial decisions in such a restrictive way as postulated by formalism? Even the most 
ardent proponents of formalism do not claim that there is something in the nature of 
law that requires this interpretative strategy to be the preferred tool in adjudication 
[37]. Quite the opposite, formalism is typically defended as a framework necessary 
to limit judicial discretion and in this way facilitating values such as rule of law, 
legal legitimacy, and predictability of law [39].
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However, as Sunstein once noticed, a more pragmatic approach to the choice 
between judicial interpretative strategies could be preferable, one that focuses on 
empirical claims about the performance of (non-ideal) legal actors [40]. Under such 
an approach, formalism with its limited set of legitimate legal reasons would be bet-
ter than other interpretative strategies if it led to smaller social costs resulting from 
decision costs and error costs generated by imperfect decision-makers. This line of 
argumentation has been long present in the work of formalism’s most prominent 
defender, Frederick Schauer. He argues that the extremely non-formalist approach 
to legal interpretation, one that takes all possibly relevant factors into consideration 
while deciding every particular case, could lead to first-best solutions, socially opti-
mal rulings in every case [41]. However, such a first-best outcome would be achiev-
able only in a world populated by ideally rational judges with unlimited computa-
tional resources. In our world, non-formalist judges, trying to take into account a 
large number of factors, are more likely to err, thus generating costs that can out-
weigh the benefits of avoiding over- and under-inclusion, a typical problem resulting 
from formalism. In other words, formalism, by reducing the number of considera-
tions to be taken into account, makes a complicated decision much more tractable 
for the imperfect judge, thus limiting the costs of decision errors. Under some condi-
tions, formalism can be the best tool to achieve second-best judicial decisions in our 
imperfect world.
What kind of errors may be made by non-formalist judges wanting to take an 
unlimited set of factors into consideration? The most obvious answer, provided by 
Schauer, is errors stemming from the incapacity of the human mind to deal with 
decision-making based on too many factors. In line with this, it has been suggested 
that judges deciding cases in a non-formalist mode may be more susceptible to mul-
tiple kinds of biases, such as cognitive biases known from research in cognitive psy-
chology [42, 43]. Here, another instance of psychological effects that might affect 
judicial decision-making is ACP, as described earlier. As it was noted, the tendency 
to make different decisions depending on the level of abstraction to which a moral/
legal problem was presented, may be explained by the differing impact of subjects’ 
affective empathy on their decision-making process. If so, formalist judges, who are 
expected to deliver their rulings independently of any extratextual factors (including 
their feelings of empathy), might be expected to produce less inconsistent judgments 
by being less susceptible to ACP.
4.3  Formalist Poland
The style of judicial reasoning in Poland, like in other Central and Eastern Euro-
pean (CEE) countries, is still largely determined by its Communist history. Even 
though the constitutional reforms in CEE countries after the fall of Communism 
in 1989 and the subsequent accession of most of these countries to the European 
Union resulted in a fundamental legal change, there are still many remnants of the 
former system present in their legal culture and in judicial practice. Formalist think-
ing about law and its application is one of them. It was present in legal education 
and courtroom practice in Poland during the period of real socialism, and still is the 
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dominating way of thinking about law in academia as well as in legal doctrine and 
practice. Every instance of judicial activism is considered highly controversial [44].
Historical reasons for adapting formalism as judicial ideology were paradoxically 
twofold: on the one hand, it was acquiescent with the predominant Marxist-Leninist 
theory of law, but, at the same time, strictly following the letter of the law was also 
a way for judges to mitigate the influence of the official state ideology on actual 
rulings [45, 46]. To be more precise, the ideology of socialist normativism, which, 
starting from the last 1930s, was the official judicial ideology in the Soviet Union 
(and, subsequently, in its satellite states in the post-Stalinist era) and was character-
ized by “a rigid statist conception of law and formalist theory of adjudication” [47]. 
This kind of legal philosophy and practice has been described as “hyperpositivism”, 
or, as a reference to a term coined by Pound, “mechanical jurisprudence” [45, 48, 
49]. It is widely accepted in the literature that the remarkable judicial formalism in 
CEE countries in general (and in Poland in particular) is a characteristic feature, dif-
fering these countries from other Continental legal systems and making them “the 
last bastion of formalism” [48, 50, 51]. The dominating opinion in the literature is 
that such a judicial strategy leaves judges unprepared for the new reality, in which 
they are expected to interpret even clear legal rules in light of constitutional princi-
ples and EU law[46]. What are the key symptoms indicating the strength of formal-
ist thinking in Polish jurisprudence?
Firstly, the Polish Constitution of 1997 provides a closed catalogue of sources 
of law, which is commonly understood as limiting law to statutory regulations. 
Although the impact of precedents and legal doctrine is very significant, it does not 
count as law per se and it hardly ever leads to rulings inconsistent with the linguistic 
interpretation of the applicable statutory rule.
Secondly, regarding the issue of judicial ideology, that is, what is the role of 
the judge in legal proceedings, it is widely accepted that the role of judge is rather 
restricted, especially concerning lower-tier courts. As noted by Rafał Mańko, the 
preferable way to solve a case in Polish courts is to focus on the procedural and for-
mal issues—if it is possible to dismiss a case on formal grounds, the court would not 
go to the substance of the matter [45]. This can be explained both by the tendency 
for judges to reduce their effort as well as to minimize the risk of overruling by the 
higher-instance court [52]. This tendency of Polish judges to employ formalism as a 
tool to reduce their workload, often labelled “escape into formalism”, can be further 
explained by the fact that the explosion of caseload in the post-Communist transition 
period was not immediately accompanied by providing courts with additional staff 
and resources [46, 53]. Another factor contributing to the prevalence of formalism in 
a legal culture is its central role in the process of legal education, both in law schools 
and during the training of prospective judges [53]. Students are taught mostly about 
the law applicable at the time, with little attention to its background justification or 
to its critical analysis, which would show the underlying moral and political values 
[39]. Furthermore, there is a relatively marginal focus in legal education on teaching 
the practice of argumentation and reasoning [45, 46].
Thirdly, one of the crucial, widely discussed issues in Polish legal theory is the 
role and methods of legal interpretation. Although these issues are subject to numer-
ous controversies in Polish legal academia, most authors agree that the linguistic 
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canon of interpretation enjoys lexical priority, and other canons of interpretation are 
ancillary, being called out only when the result of linguistic interpretation provides 
ambiguity or is obviously absurd [54, 55]. The same conclusion follows from case 
law of Polish courts. For example, the ruling of Polish Constitutional Tribunal from 
28.06.2000 stated the priority of linguistic interpretation regarding the interpreta-
tion of constitutional provisions concerning the sources of law. The Polish Constitu-
tion of 1997 provides an enumerative catalogue limiting the sources of binding law 
to acts of Parliament, international agreements, and statutorily authorized govern-
mental regulations, as well as acts issued by administrative organs in their statutory 
discretion (see Article 87 of the Polish Constitution of 1997). In the cited ruling, 
the Constitutional Tribunal decided that no official document that is not explicitly 
listed in the Constitution can count as a source of law in the Republic of Poland. 
The same ruling provided, however, some strict criteria allowing for the possibility 
of using other kinds of statutory interpretation, i.e., functional interpretation [56]. 
Moreover, referring to extratextual legal standards, such as constitutional principles, 
is still quite rare in legal opinions. Stawecki and colleagues note that this happens 
despite the direct applicability of constitutional provisions (see Article 8.2 of the 
Polish Constitution of 1997) [57].
Despite the near-universal consensus in the theoretical literature on formalism as 
a distinctive feature of the Polish and other CEE legal systems, some authors point 
out that appropriate empirical research is needed to corroborate this thesis [47]. For-
tunately, some empirical data in this regard is already available.
Studies by Matczak, Bencze, and Kühn appear to be the only attempt to date 
at assessing the pervasiveness of formalist judicial strategies in CEE countries by 
empirically analyzing actual court decisions [46]. It should be noted that there also 
exists survey research indicating that Polish judges themselves openly express their 
preference for the formalist judicial strategy. For example, in a study by Pałecki, 
a majority of surveyed Polish judges pointed to the linguistic canon of legal inter-
pretation as their preferred one [52]. A systematic, although purely qualitative and 
slightly dated, comparison of judicial strategies in different jurisdictions, indicating 
a relatively large level of formalism in the Polish judiciary, can be found in a paper 
by Wróblewski [54].
Matczak and his colleagues examined a set of rulings issued by supreme adminis-
trative courts in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland and assessed the relative 
frequency with which judges based their judgments on references to four classes 
of “standards”, as defined by the authors [46]. These “standards” were: (i) stand-
ards internal to law (linguistic interpretation, systemic interpretation, rational law-
maker assumption, references to previous decisions; this class encompasses typical 
instances of the formalist strategy, according to the authors), (ii) standards external 
to law (compliance with the legislature’s intention, the social objective or purpose 
of a law, preventive function of a law), (iii) constitutional standards (such as pro-
portionality principle, freedom of business, protection of private property, or anti-
discrimination principles), and (iv) standards originating from the European Union 
law (EU directives, EU legal principles, such as the fundamental freedoms, as well 
as the CJEU case law). In their first study, analyzing judgments from 1999–2004, 
i.e., from the period directly preceding the subject countries’ accession to the EU, 
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Matczak and his colleagues found that the overwhelming majority of references in 
their sample of rulings was to the class of standards internal to law, the typically 
formalist arguments [46]. For example, in Poland, over 81% of analyzed references 
were to internal standards, around 10% to external standards, 7% to constitutional 
standards, while the number of references to EU standards were negligible. The sec-
ond study by Kühn, Matczak and Bencze analyzed a set composed of rulings issued 
in the period following the subject countries’ accession to the EU (2005–2013), this 
time drawing a slightly more complicated picture [53]. To again focus on Poland, 
the relative frequency of references to internal standards decreased by almost 7 
p.p., when compared to the previous period. This could be largely attributed to the 
increase in references to EU standards, which now accounted for 5% of all refer-
ences. On the other hand, almost no change was recorded with regard to references 
to constitutional and external standards (which would have been more indicative of 
an actual decrease in formalism; the dynamic was quite similar in CZ and HU). All 
in all, the authors’ conclusion that the EU accession triggered a substantial decrease 
in judicial formalism in CEE countries seems a bit premature: while it indeed looks 
that the accession forced CEE judges to directly apply principles of EU law, this 
change was not accompanied by a greater willingness to employ more typical non-
formalist interpretative tools. The picture emerging from the authors’ second study 
presents CEE judges almost 10 years after EU 2004 eastward enlargement as still 
being staunch formalists. One noteworthy tendency visible in both studies by Matc-
zak and his colleagues is that while Poland was consistently a bit less formalist than 
Hungary, both countries remained definitely more formalist than the Czech Republic 
[46]. The authors explain this Czech exceptionalism by the fact that, throughout the 
transition period, the Czech Constitutional Court had explicitly provided common 
courts with motivation to directly apply constitutional principles and other extratex-
tual factors to cases at hand. This element of effective motivation provided by the 
Constitutional Tribunal was missing in Poland, as noted by Stawecki and colleagues 
[57]. Even though the Polish Constitution of 1997 contains an explicit presumption 
of direct applicability of its provisions, it has not really become a part of Polish judi-
cial practice to make use of this opportunity.
It would seem that at least the Polish Constitutional Court would be less for-
malist, since by its nature it rules on the constitutionality of statutory acts on the 
basis of constitutional principles. However, a study by Stawecki and colleagues 
indicates otherwise [57]. These authors analyzed a random sample of rulings 
of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal finding that the modes of interpretation 
used most frequently in the rulings were systemic and linguistic interpretation 
(30–50%, depending on the interpretation of the comparative method). Simi-
lar conclusion was drawn from the analysis of the rulings of the administrative 
courts, corroborating the results obtained by Matczak and his colleagues [46]. 
The authors reach this conclusion from the fact that in administrative rulings 
practically no references to policies apart from the rule-based adjudication are 
made, and they interpret this as a clear sign of a highly formalist approach.
In sum, while judges in Brazil are celebrated and promoted for deviating from 
legal materials, in Poland any departure from a literal interpretation is unusual 
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and typically frowned upon. In other words, the Polish legal culture is decisively 
formalist while Brazilian lawyers are more particularist.
5  Study I—Perceived Judicial Formalism
The preceding section reviewed a wide legal literature, as well as fragmentary 
empirical research, suggesting that the Polish judicial system is exceptionally for-
malist while the Brazilian one is exceptionally particularist. In the present section, 
we evaluate this hypothesis of cultural variation in adjudication style by measur-
ing differences in formalism and particularism across these two jurisdictions using a 
common instrument. However, since no such tool, to the best of our knowledge, has 
been presented so far, it is something we had to develop from scratch.
One direct approach would be to analyze the content of judicial opinions; 
although this qualitative approach may be confounded by other cultural and linguis-
tic differences (such as the length or style of judicial opinions). Hence, it is hard to 
ensure that such naturalistic comparisons across cultures are valid.
Instead, we measured the degree of formalism through a single, novel psycho-
metric instrument that relies on expert perceptions of the predominant adjudication 
style. The expert population whose perceptions we focus on are law graduates affili-
ated with a law school. There are a number of reasons to believe that law professors 
are the group most likely to have an accurate vision of the style in which judges 
decide cases. First of all, the core of work of most legal academics is studying the 
argumentation used in a wide range of judicial rulings. Second, the perception of 
law professors, unlike that of judges or practicing lawyers, is relatively less likely 
to be biased by professional loyalties or personal involvement in the legal process. 
Finally, it seems that law academics can be expected to have at least superficial 
familiarity with foreign legal systems, thus they might appreciate those features of 
their domestic legal order that are actually distinctive.
We intended to measure the perception of the style of judicial decision-making 
using a scale that we developed largely tracking the protocol formulated by Hinkin 
[58]. Our choice of items was fully guided by the analysis of the relevant literature. 
First, following the most notable definition of formalism [38, 41] we ask whether 
judges decide cases in accordance with the literal meaning of the applicable rule 
even when they personally disagree with the result. Second, we follow the argu-
ments that formalist decision-making might be driven by the aspiration to secure 
consistency and predictability of law [41]. Accordingly, we ask whether judges 
decide cases in a way intended to secure those two values. Third, many authors 
claim that formalism can be a safe strategy for reversal-averse judges, since judicial 
decisions consistent with the literal meaning of the applicable rule are less likely 
to be reversed by a higher-instance court [52]. Accordingly, we ask whether judges 
expect that their rulings inconsistent with literal meaning face an increased risk of 
being reversed by a higher instance. Finally, many authors suggest that judicial for-
malism implies that there is less need to engage in first-order moral reasoning while 
deciding legal cases [41, 59]. Hence, we ask whether judges tend to write their opin-
ions in legal, rather than moral, terms.
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Then, we also generated some reverse-coded items (in which an affirmative 
answer indicates greater particularism). Here, we follow the literature in construct-
ing particularist judges as aspiring to realize the underlying goal of a given rule 
when applying it [60], always wanting to deliver justice to the parties to a given 
legal dispute, even at the expense of other legal values, grounding their legal opin-
ions in fundamental constitutional principles even when it is not necessary [31]. 
Furthermore, we speculate that judicial particularism might be motivated by pub-
lic opinion’s aversion to rulings that seemingly fail to do justice. Accordingly, we 
ask whether judges face criticism when they privilege applying the rules over doing 
justice.
Item Factor loadings α if item dropped
F1 F2
Formalism (Cronbach’s α = 0.76)
 When possible, judges decide cases on the basis of the literal 
meaning of the applicable rule, even if they do not personally 
agree with the rule-generated result
0.919 0.62
 Judges decide cases in a way that aims at ensuring the consist-
ency and predictability of law
0.576 −0.352 0.72
 Judges expect to be over-ruled by a higher instance when they 
depart from what the literal meaning of the applicable rule 
mandates
0.583 0.73
 Judges try hard to draft their opinions in legal, rather than 
moralistic, terms
0.563 0.73
Particularisma (Cronbach’s α = 0.57)b
 Judges decide cases in a way that facilitates achieving the pur-
pose of applicable law
−0.210 0.707 0.55
 When deciding a case, judges aspire to do justice to the parties 
even at the expense of other legal values
0.327 0.439 0.51
 Judges are criticized when they privilege applying the rules over 
doing justice
−0.318 0.213 −
 Even when it is unnecessary, judges aspire to ground their rul-
ings in fundamental constitutional principles
0.300 0.604 0.31
a All items reverse-scored.
b Reliability after the third item dropped.
Before reading the items (translated into Polish and Portuguese, respectively), 
participants were asked to think about how judges in different jurisdictions decide 
cases and how Polish (/Brazilian) judges decide cases. Then, for each of the items, 
participants were asked to decide whether the statement accurately describes the 
behavior of typical Polish (/Brazilian) judges, when compared to the average foreign 
judge (on a 7-point Likert scale2).
2 A Likert scale is a survey tool which measures the strength of a participant’s beliefs or attitudes by 
asking them to provide a numeric value that represents this strength (see [70]).
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5.1  Participants
In total, we recruited 133 law graduates (NPoland = 63; NBrazil = 70) for this study. 
Polish participants (mean age = 41.5  years, 27 women) were recruited via fac-
ulty mailing lists at 8 high-tier Polish law schools. Brazilian participants (mean 
age = 46  years, 27 women) were recruited via a mailing list of peer reviewers for 
a prestigious law journal. In both jurisdictions, we managed to recruit samples 
overwhelmingly consisting of subjects with experience working in legal academia 
(although many participants also reported other kinds of professional experience). 
These professional categories were non-mutually-exclusive: in Brazil, 61 partici-
pants were law professors, 48 were attorneys, and 3 were judges; in Poland, 54 were 
law professors, 36 were attorneys, and 13 were judges.
5.2  Factor Analysis
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted using a minimum residual factor anal-
ysis with an oblimin rotation.3 Applying the Kaiser criterion [61], and examining 
the scree plot [62] we concluded that our scale was composed of two factors. The 
two-factor solution shows that all items but one loaded significantly on either of two 
factors that can be described as ‘formalism’ and ‘particularism’ dimensions—in 
line with our a priori classification. The only exception was the item “Judges are 
criticized when they privilege applying the rules over doing justice” whose load on 
either item did not exceed 0.40, which provided us with a sufficient reason to delete 
this item [63].
This way, we ended up with three items in the particularism dimension and four 
items in the formalism dimension. The inter-factor correlation is equal to 0.02. 
Finally, we assessed the internal consistency4 of both scales. Cronbach’s α [64] for 
the formalism dimension is equal to 0.76, indicating fair reliability; Cronbach’s α for 
the particularism dimension is equal to 0.57, which implies that it is unreliable.
3 As a typical survey measures a number of distinct latent traits in the target population, an explora-
tory factor analysis aims at combining questionnaire items into factors—observed measures of those 
latent traits. The optimal number of factors depends both on the underlying theory and on the applica-
tion of some possible quantitative analyses, such as the Kaiser criterion or scree plot methods. Having 
established the number of factors, factor analysis determines the extent to which each questionnaire item 
‘loads’ on each factor, allowing to associate a given item to the factor to which it provides the greatest 
load. In the present context, we employed a factor analysis with oblimin rotation, which allows factors to 
be non-orthogonal, that is, it allows for some level of correlation between factors. See [58].
4 Internal consistency refers to the degree of covariance between different items of the same measure. 
Good internal consistency indicates that the measure is reliable. Cronbach’s α is a measure of internal 
consistency based on pairwise correlations between items and it can take values between 0 and 1. Cron-
bach’s α of .7 is considered the minimum to consider a given measure reliable. See [58].
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5.3  Cross‑Country Comparison
Here we report a series of one-sample t-tests against the scale midpoint. Since 
the scale midpoint was labeled “[Polish/Brazilian judges behave this way] as fre-
quently as foreign judges”, a significant difference from the midpoint indicates that a 
given judicial system is perceived as below or above average in either formalism or 
particularism.
As for the formalism scale, Brazilian judges were seen as significantly less for-
malist than foreign judges (M = 3.00, t(69) = −7.10, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.85), 
while Polish judges as significantly more formalist than foreign judges (M = 4.67, 
t(66) = 7.16, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.87).5
Turning to the (unreliable) particularism scale, both in Brazil and in Poland 
judges were seen as below average on particularism (Brazil: M = 3.64, t(69) = −2.29, 
p = 0.012, Cohen’s d = 0.27; Poland: M = 3.17, t(66) = -7.42, p < 0.001, Cohen’s 
d = 0.91). Still, Brazilian judges were perceived as significantly more particularistic 
than Polish judges (t(123.2) = 2.42, p = 0.02, Cohen’s d = 0.41)—in partial support 
of our prediction.
5.4  Discussion
To corroborate our assumption that the Brazilian and Polish judiciaries are located 
on the opposite ends of the formalism/particularism spectrum, we conducted a study 
measuring legal experts’ (law professors’) informant ratings of judges’ behavior, 
specifically, with regard to the predominance of formalism versus particularism in 
each judicial system. The exploratory factor analysis showed that our scale clearly 
split into two dimensions, which we interpreted as ‘formalism’ and ‘particularism’ 
dimensions. While the particularism items turned out to be unreliable, the formalism 
dimension can be declared fairly reliable. On this dimension, we found that Brazil-
ians see their judicial system as less formalist than other judicial systems while the 
reverse is true for Poles—with both effects being large. Finally, a direct comparison 
of Brazilian and Polish perceptions of formalism indicates a very large difference in 
the predicted direction.
Study I offered conclusive quantitative evidence in support of the hypothesis we 
derived from the literature review in the preceding section: namely, that Brazil and 
Poland exemplify different approaches to legal interpretation and, as such, allow us 
to test the moderating role of formalism on the susceptibility to psychological effects 
in the kind of ACP.
5 Unsurprisingly, the direct comparison between the Brazilian and Polish scores also reveals a significant 
difference in the predicted direction: t(119.5) = 9.88, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.67.
 P. Bystranowski et al.
1 3
6  Study II
6.1  Motivation of the Study
Struchiner and colleagues reported evidence that laypeople and legal professionals 
are equally susceptible to ACP, even when interpreting characteristically legal rules 
[2]. We reasoned that this result may reflect a peculiarity of particularist approaches 
to interpretation, and that a formalist style of legal reasoning could help to rein in 
various psychological effects [42]. Our survey of legal experts (Study I) established 
that, indeed, the Brazilian judiciary is perceived as less formalist than average, while 
Poland is perceived as more formalist than average.
Having established such national differences in interpretation style, we proceed 
next to our primary test. In our following study, we experimentally manipulate con-
creteness (closely following the methods of Struchiner and colleagues [2]) and eval-
uate whether such variation affects the judicial decision-making of legal profession-
als drawn from a predominantly formalist culture (i.e., Poland). If formalist judges 
are less susceptible to ACP, this would partially vindicate certain defenses of for-
malism, which emphasize its capacity to promote consistency of judicial decision-
making. To test these assumptions, we formulated the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Participants will endorse judicial intervention more frequently in con-
crete cases than corresponding abstract cases (this hypothesis assumes the general 
pattern of results observed by Struchiner and his colleagues [2] will be replicated 
with Polish subjects).
Hypothesis 2 Participants with legal training will reveal a weaker effect of concrete-
ness than either:
(a) participants without legal training,
(b) participants with legal training in the Brazilian study.
Hypothesis 3 Judicial intervention is greater among participants high in empathic 
concern and/or perspective-taking.
6.2  Participants
Our study included three groups of participants:
1. Judges: A total of 72 people participated in the study in this category, with 
three subjects leaving the demographic questionnaire blank. All judges were 
approached during training sessions for judges, organized by the Polish National 
School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution. Out of 69 participants (mean 
age = 41), 18 (26 percent) were men. On average, participants in this category 
had 12 years (SD = 5,52) of professional experience as a judge and 17 (SD = 6,91) 
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years of professional experience in general. Judges were specialized in civil law 
(n = 38), criminal law (n = 14), family law (n = 7), labor and social security law 
(n = 4), and commercial law (n = 2).
2. Law students: This category included 183 participants, with two leaving the 
demographic questionnaire blank (mean age = 22).
3. Laypeople: This category consisted of 86 undergraduate students (mean age = 22), 
most of whom were Polish literature or computer science majors.
Law students and laypeople were approached while attending university classes. 
Participation was voluntary, such that no participants were financially or otherwise 
rewarded for completing the study.
6.3  Design and Procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: abstract (“HIGH”), intermediate (“MID”), or concrete (“LOW”). Par-
ticipants in each condition were handed a printed copy of the questionnaire, which 
included: (1) four short vignettes (at one of the three levels of abstraction), (2) the 
empathic concern and perspective-taking subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index [28], and (3) a demographic questionnaire. Full texts of the vignettes are to be 
found in “Appendix 1”.
6.3.1  Case Vignettes
Each of the four case vignettes presented a short story in which a legal dispute arose, 
accompanied by a short reference to relevant laws. Each of the four scenarios was 
translated from Struchiner and colleagues’ study, with some adaptations to the con-
text of the Polish legal system.
Subjects read a case in which an individual dissatisfied with an administrative 
decision filed a complaint against it to the court, and were asked whether the respec-
tive administrative court should annul the decision (1: “Yes”) or dismiss the case (0: 
“No”). As in the original study, three vignettes (Medication, Police, Exam) effec-
tively asked the subjects to decide whether a court should apply an unequivocal legal 
rule, which, however, can lead to undesirable results in a particular setting. On the 
other hand, in one vignette based on the real case of Manuel Wackenheim v. France 
(2002) before the UN Human Rights Committee (Little person) the basic issue was 
whether the principle of human dignity should be understood as allowing the state 
to paternalistically prevent individuals from making choices perceived as detrimen-
tal to themselves or rather as requiring the state to always respect the autonomy of 
individual choice.
As noted above, the vignettes were presented at one of three levels of abstraction:
HIGH: which presented a given problem as a hypothetical case;
MID: which described a particular case, but without any identifying details;
LOW: which described a particular case and included legally-irrelevant identi-
fying details (e.g., proper names, locations).
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For example, in the Medication case at the HIGH level, subjects were merely 
informed that, by law, the state only covers the cost of medications previously listed 
on the Reimbursed Drugs List and drugs not included on this list can be reimbursed 
only after the Minister of Health agrees to do so. This was followed by an abstract 
question of whether administrative courts should annul negative decisions by the 
Minister of Health if a given medication is necessary to cure specific individuals. 
On the MID level, the subjects were presented with the same description of the legal 
regulation, which was followed, though, by the description of a more specific legal 
case: some unidentified woman needs to undergo an expensive pharmacological 
therapy (that she cannot afford herself) not included on the Reimbursed Drugs List. 
After the Minister of Health issued a final decision refusing the reimbursement, the 
woman sues him before an administrative court. The subjects were asked whether 
the court should decide in favor of the plaintiff and annul the Minister’s decision. 
Finally, the LOW version shared the structure with the MID level but also furnished 
a series of legally irrelevant details: the name and age of the woman, her place of 
residence, the name of her disease as well as the name of the medication she needed 
(as mentioned above, this difference boils down to the degree of identifiability).
6.3.2  Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Following Struchiner and his colleagues, we included two subscales of a Pol-
ish adaptation of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index [28] by Kaźmierczak and col-
leagues [65]: empathic concern and perspective-taking. These subscales capture 
affective and cognitive aspects of empathy, respectively. As mentioned earlier, affec-
tive theories posit that emotional processes undergird ACP. For instance, partici-
pants might be more empathetic towards identified individuals and favor particular-
ist outcomes that cater to these individuals’ needs.
6.3.3  Demographics
A demographics section included questions about participants’ gender and age. 
Additionally, judges were asked about their general legal experience, experience as a 
judge, type of court in which they work, as well as the area of law in which they spe-
cialize. Law students were asked about the year of their study as well as some other 
details regarding their curriculum.
6.4  Results
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics by vignette jointly for all participants. To eval-
uate the aforementioned hypotheses, we conducted mixed-effects logistic regression 
with participant’s id and scenario as crossed random effects, using the lme4 package 
[66] in R version 3.5.1.
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6.4.1  Hypothesis 1. Does the ACP Effect Replicate in a Formalist Culture?
The tendency toward judicial intervention varied across levels of concreteness, 
χ2(2) = 13.27, p = 0.001 (see Fig.  2). Compared to the HIGH condition (ŷ = 0.36), 
participants were more likely to favor judicial intervention in the LOW (ŷ = 0.48), 
OR = 1.64, z = 3.51, p < 0.001,6 and MID (ŷ = 0.44), OR = 1.41, z = 2.54, p = 0.014, 
conditions. When looking at professional judges alone, the comparison between 
MID and HIGH remained significant, z = 2.11, p = 0.035, whereas the low vs high 
comparison did not, z = 1.63, p = 0.10. Figure  1 plots the predicted percentage of 
the YES answers (“the court should annul the decision”) at each of the levels of 
abstraction.
Table 1  Proportion of 
affirmative answers by scenario 
and abstraction level
a As the meaning of Yes/No answers in the case Little person is 
the opposite of the one in different cases, the coding convention is 
reversed in this case (in the present context: answer “No” counts 
as affirmative). The reversed coding of this scenario is assumed 
throughout the rest of the article

























Fig. 1  Violin plots for the formalist and particularist dimensions of the scale
6 ŷ refers to the predicted percentage of answers in favor of intervention, OR means “odds ratio”, z is the 
regression coefficient divided by its standard error, and p refers to the p-value.
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As predicted in Hypothesis 1, we observed significant differences between con-
ditions in the predicted direction. Relative to abstract formulations, participants 
were more likely to favor judicial intervention in concrete (i.e., Mid and Low) cases. 
Thus, the main result of the original study by Struchiner and his colleagues [2] rep-
licated in Poland.
6.4.2  Hypothesis 2a. Does Expertise Mitigate the Effect of ACP?
We checked whether legal experience (judge vs. student vs. layperson) mitigates 
susceptibility to ACP using likelihood ratio tests. We first investigated whether (1) 
expertise interacted with concreteness and, then, whether (2) expertise exerted a 
main effect on decisions.
If gaining legal expertise decreased the susceptibility to ACP (i.e., the more 
legally educated the subjects, the more consistent their responses across concrete-
ness levels), then we would observe an interaction between expertise and the level 
of concreteness. However, this is not what happened, as adding the interaction term 
to the model did not significantly improve its fit to the data (χ2(4) = 2.18, p = 0.70). 
A Bayesian re-analysis provided decisive evidence for the absence of an exper-
tise × concreteness interaction,  BF01 = 193.06.
On the other hand, if subjects with greater legal expertise were either more or 
less likely to favor judicial interventions (irrespectively of the level of abstrac-
tion), we would observe that adding the main effect of expertise to the model would 
improve model fit. Indeed, this is what happened, χ2(2) = 8.77, p = 0.012. In particu-
lar, law students were more opposed to judicial intervention (ŷ = 0.39) than either 
judges (ŷ = 0.48), OR = 0.91, z = 2.43, p = 0.015, or laypeople (ŷ = 0.47), OR = 0.89, 
z = 2.37, p = 0.018.
6.4.3  Hypothesis 2b. Does a Formalist Culture Mitigate the Effect of ACP?
Next, in order to examine the difference between formalist and particularist legal 
cultures, we jointly analyzed the results obtained in Poland and those reported in 
Struchiner and colleagues’ study [2], and treated culture (i.e., Poland, Brazil) as an 
additional factor in the following analyses. Once again, we compared the model fit 
using likelihood ratio tests, to assess whether (1) culture interacted with concrete-
ness, and/or (2) exerted a main effect on decisions.
Adding the culture × condition interaction term did not increase model fit, 
χ2(2) = 0.93, p = 0.63, and neither did adding the main effect of culture, χ2(1) = 0.32, 
p = 0.57. Thus, we found no evidence that participants in one culture were more 
prone to ACP than participants in the other culture, or that participants from 
either culture are more likely to favor judicial intervention overall. Furthermore, 
Bayesian model comparisons revealed strong evidence of no cultural moderation 
 (BF01 = 50.16), and substantial evidence of no mean difference in judicial interven-
tion  (BF01 = 10.97).
Repeating the above analyses on the subset of legal professionals did not sub-
stantially alter the results: The culture × condition interaction did not attain statisti-
cal significance, χ2(2) = 3.42, p = 0.18, and neither did the main effect of culture, 
1 3
Do Formalist Judges Abide By Their Abstract Principles? A…
χ2(1) = 2.05, p = 0.15—though in this case support for the null models was much 
more modest  (BF01 = 4.68, 3.70). If anything, the difference trended in the oppo-
site direction—with Polish professionals (ŷ = 0.47) slightly more likely to favor par-
ticularist decisions than Brazilian professionals (ŷ = 0.40). Importantly, even among 
legal professionals, the condition term improved model fit, χ2(2) = 7.26, p = 0.027—
suggesting that Brazilian and Polish professionals alike reveal ACP effects.
6.4.4  Hypothesis 3. Does Empathic Concern/Perspective Taking Affect 
the Decisions?
To assess the influence of empathic concern and perspective-taking, we conducted 
a series of model comparisons (between linear mixed-effects regressions) with 
and without the z-scored IRI scores entered as fixed effects. First, we sequentially 
added (i) the perspective-taking term, and (ii) the perspective-taking × concreteness 
interaction. Neither model comparison yielded effects of perspective-taking, both 
ps > 0.05. Next, we repeated the process with the empathic concern term: Adding 
the empathic concern term improved model fit (F(5,6) = 6.422, p < 0.01), whereas 
adding the empathic concern × concreteness interaction term did not. The model 
comparison suggested that empathy plays a similar role across conditions, with more 
empathic participants somewhat more likely to decide in favor of judicial review in 
any condition, OR = 1.15, p = 0.011. However, when looking separately by levels of 
concreteness, the simple effects of empathic concern did not reach the threshold of 
statistical significance.
Thus, at a broad level, we obtained convergent evidence that empathic concern, 
but not perspective-taking, is implicated in participants’ decision-making. A closer 
Fig. 2  Percentage of decisions in favor of judicial interference by condition with comparison of differ-
ences (all groups of subjects analyzed jointly)
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look at the effect of empathic concern revealed a subtle, but noteworthy, differ-
ence across studies: While in the study by Struchiner and his colleagues empathic 
concern played a selective role in mid-level conditions, our present data revealed a 
weaker main effect across levels of abstraction.
7  Discussion
The central objective of this study was to test the assumption that the strategy of 
judicial interpretation that legal decision-makers typically adopt in a given jurisdic-
tion affects their propensity to some psychological effects known from cognitive 
psychology and experimental moral philosophy. More specifically, we wanted to 
test a view often favored by some proponents of legal formalism that legal decision-
makers accustomed to sticking to the literal meaning of rules whenever possible 
would be more immune to many biases affecting judgement and decision-making. 
Furthermore, as much as such biases are assumed to lead to normatively undesirable 
consequences, the increased immunity to them would be an argument in favor of 
formalism as an interpretive strategy.
We tested this assumption against the operation of ACP and IE effect, two pos-
sibly intertwined psychological effects which are particularly likely to affect the 
process of legal interpretation (and to be qualified as unwelcome biases by formal-
ists). Our study compared the behavior of Brazilian and Polish participants. This 
choice was based on existing legal literature suggesting that those two legal cultures 
exemplify particularism and formalism, respectively, and was further justified by our 
novel assessment of differences in interpretation style (Study 1).
For the purpose of examining our primary prediction (Study 2), the most inform-
ative group of subjects was the sample of professional Polish judges. They might 
be construed as engaging in formalist mode of reasoning to an extreme extent: (a) 
because they come from a generally formalist legal culture, and (b) because, as 
members of the Polish judiciary, they accrued professional experience and persisted 
in an environment that rewards adherence to the literal meaning of the law.
If the formalist strategy of legal interpretation indeed insulated its practition-
ers from effects such as ACP and IE, we would have observed that Polish judges 
revealed smaller differences between conditions than either Brazilian judges 
(because of differences in legal culture) or Polish laypeople (due to their legal 
education).
However, that is not what we found. Instead, we established that ACP emerged 
even in a formalist culture such as Poland. The comparison between abstraction con-
ditions yielded a clear pattern of results in which the high level differed significantly 
from the intermediate and low levels. Participants in the high abstraction condition 
were less likely to favor judicial intervention than were participants in the other 
conditions.
What is more, legal expertise did not influence participants’ susceptibility to 
ACP, insofar as lawyers and laypeople alike demonstrated the effect. Finally, com-
paring Polish and Brazilian data showed that neither general cultural differences 
(that would be present even among laypeople), nor specifically legal culture (in the 
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subsets of legal professionals) affected participants’ responses. The replication of 
Struchiner and his colleagues’ results [2] in the general sample of Polish subjects 
also seems to contradict the speculation that the propensity to ACP in legal contexts 
might be driven by general cultural differences, e.g. by differences in tightness.
Should this be interpreted as a serious argument against the assumption of insula-
tive effect of formalism? It certainly implies that proponents of formalism should 
more cautiously rely on uncorroborated empirical claims and accept a greater bur-
den of proof. Moreover, it may be that effectively applying a formalist strategy is 
more cognitively demanding than previously assumed.
Interestingly, the group that showed the strongest adherence to the formalist strat-
egy—opposing judicial interventions—was the student group. One may argue that 
students react in such a way because they are taught the rigorous canons of legal 
interpretation. The methods remain vivid in their legal reasoning and they have lit-
tle exposure to real-life courtroom practice. On the other hand, professional judges 
become more pragmatic over the course of their legal practice and learn how to 
exercise discretion within the boundaries of legal interpretation.
However, unequivocal implications are not easy to draw from our study, due to 
some limitations in its design. First and foremost, our study relied on hypothetical 
vignettes and a simulated context; and this methodology is often criticized as lack-
ing ecological validity, especially when compared with the natural environment in 
which judicial decision-making occurs. Such criticism might be overblown, since 
the results of many vignette studies on judges have been subsequently corroborated 
by field studies and analyses of actual rulings [67]. Second, the cases were limited to 
the domain of administrative law, to capture a tension between individual interests 
and the interest of the general public. Therefore, generalizing the results to other 
branches of the the law, i.e., private (where individual interests collide) and crimi-
nal (in which the individual has special guarantees), may be premature and more 
research is needed in this context.
One should also note that even if we consider the administrative proceedings as 
the most formalist branch of adjudication (as suggested earlier), the judges in the 
Polish sample were operating outside their area of specialization (this was not the 
case in Brazilian sample, where the professional sample included federal court 
judges, who solve administrative motions as well). This can be interpreted in two 
ways. On one hand, judges may become more formalist in their area of specializa-
tion, as their day-to-day work desensitizes them to human factors invoking empathy. 
On the other hand, judges working outside their specialization may stick to formalist 
interpretation, as they will be unfamiliar with the specifics of the given branch of 
law and the formalist strategy would be a safe choice. This dilemma also asks for an 
empirical solution.
There are reasons to believe that the lack of ecological validity might be espe-
cially problematic for our study, since the incentives for judges to stick to the lit-
eral meaning while applying legal rules were absent here. For example, a judge 
might follow the formalist strategy to minimize the risk of overruling by the appel-
late court. Thus, judges who are strict formalists in ‘real life,’ turn into particular-
ists when institutional incentives are absent. Accepting said objection, however, 
would lead to rather interesting conclusions. If the professional subjects in our study 
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did not follow their normal legal mode of reasoning, then arguably they exhibited 
the result of their moral judgment. And if so, this would mean that even legal pro-
fessionals trained in a formalist environment remain particularist in their moral 
decision-making.
Such an interpretation would actually constitute another argument against some 
of the points made by proponents of formalism. As Schauer says, legal training is 
largely a training in second-order moral reasoning, i.e. in accepting that compelling 
prima facie reasons to decide a particular problem in one way might be trumped by 
obedience to higher order rules suggesting a different, seemingly suboptimal solu-
tion [68]. To follow an example from our study: even if there are compelling prima 
facie reasons to provide a suffering individual with public funding for the medica-
tion she needs, legally-educated decision-makers might be expected to place greater 
emphasis on the reasons to enforce overarching, budgetary rules in the public health 
system. However, this is exactly what the aforementioned interpretation of our 
results seems to contradict: in the absence of typical institutional incentives, formal-
ist legal professionals are as likely as non-lawyers to succumb to compelling prima 
facie moral reasons.7 Even if this offers a plausible interpretation of our results, it 
is also largely speculative. However, we believe that it most definitely points at an 
interesting direction for future research.
Finally, we should mention the fact that two factors crucial to this study (the 
degree of legal experience and the strategy of legal reasoning) were not experimen-
tally manipulated, making our study quasi-experimental, and limiting our ability to 
draw valid causal inferences. Developing a genuinely experimental design is by all 
means desirable. Future studies should, for example, induce subjects into formalist 
or particularist modes of reasoning through a randomized experimental intervention.
The abstract-concrete paradox plays a prominent role in judicial decision-mak-
ing (see also [69]). Experienced judges in different countries issue concrete deci-
sions that violate the principles they espouse in the abstract—and these effects are 
seemingly inspired by their personal feelings of empathy toward one of the parties. 
Although we have emphasized their theoretical implications, we also hope that, by 
illuminating the psychological influences on judicial decision-making, experimental 
findings like ours will inspire some not only further research in this area but also—
in the long run—some policy considerations regarding whether to limit judicial 
inconsistency in practice and, if so, how.
7 Another possible interpretation of our results would question a typical implicit assumption made by 
formalism: That the meaning of facts relevant to a given case can be taken for granted and that such 
facts in conjunction with the clear meaning of a relevant rule can determine the outcome of the case. It 
is possible, however, that even if judges agree on the meaning of the relevant rule, establishing the facts 
of the case is an interpretative activity that is open to the operation of psychological mechanisms such as 
ACP. This argument would arguably be quite damning to formalism: By focusing on the literal approach 
to legal interpretation, formalism contributes to a situation in which the (equally problematic) process of 
factual interpretation occurs out of sight and is susceptible to many potential biases. We would like to 
thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
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Appendix
Exam HIGH
In order to enrol at a Polish university, a person that has graduated from a high 
school abroad must produce a document equivalent to the matura exam diploma, 
authenticated by the superintendent of schools. To authenticate this document, 
the superintendent of schools should, according to the law, require a certificate 
of high school graduation. Should administrative courts annul decisions which 
deny this authentication in the case of individuals that produced a certificate of an 
exam but not the certificate of high school graduation?
Exam MID
A Polish American sophomore student at an American high school wants to 
start university studies in Poland. She has passed the SAT exam (with excellent 
results), which is used in the admission process to American universities. In order 
to apply to a Polish university, she must produce a document equivalent to the 
matura exam diploma, authenticated by the superintendent of schools. To authen-
ticate this document, the superintendent should, according to the law, require a 
certificate of high school graduation. The student has produced the certificate of 
SAT exam, but couldn’t produce a certificate of high school graduation. Should 
the administrative court annul the final decision denying the authentication of 
certificate in case of a person that produced a certificate of SAT exam but not a 
certificate of high school graduation?
Exam LOW
Maria is a Polish American sophomore student at a high school in Chicago. She 
wants to start studies at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the Univer-
sity of Warsaw. She has passed the SAT exam (with excellent results), used in 
the admission process to American universities. In order to apply to UW, she is 
obliged to produce a document equivalent to the matura exam certificate, authen-
ticated by the superintendent of schools. To authenticate such document, the 
superintendent of schools should, according to the law, require a certificate of 
high school graduation. Maria has produced the certificate of her SAT exam, but 
she couldn’t produce a certificate of high school graduation. After the negative 
final decision, Maria filed a complaint against the decision to the administrative 
court. 
Should the administrative court annul the decision denying the authentication 
of certificate in case of Maria, who produced a certificate of the SAT exam but 
not a certificate of high school graduation?
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Police HIGH
A public post announcement for a position in uniformed services mentions, 
among preferred characteristics expected from applicants, a master’s degree in 
disciplines specified in respective regulations. Should administrative courts annul 
decisions refusing to accept those candidates who did not enter the service solely 
because they did not have a master’s degree in preferred areas?
Police MID
During the recruitment process to the Police, one person obtained very good 
results from physical fitness examination, psychological tests and from the inter-
view. However, this person was classified one place below the limit due to the 
preferences (established in the Ordinance of the Ministry of the Interior and 
Administration) given to candidates holding a master’s degree in the fields of law, 
administration, economics, or public safety. This person holds a master’s degree 
in biology. For this reason, the candidate filed a complaint against the final deci-
sion denying the acceptance to the service.
Should the administrative court annul the decision refusing to accept this 
candidate, who did not enter the service solely because of not having a master’s 
degree in the preferred areas?
Police LOW
Renata, a young unemployed resident of Proszowice, obtained very good (in com-
parison with dozens of other candidates) results from her physical fitness exami-
nation, psychological tests, and from the interview during the recruitment process 
to the Police. Renata was, however, classified one place below the limit due to 
the preferences (established in the Ordinance of the Ministry of the Interior and 
Administration) given to candidates holding a master’s degree in the fields of law, 
administration, economics, or public safety (Renata has a master’s degree in biol-
ogy). For this reason, Renata filed a complaint against the final decision denying 
the acceptance.
In such circumstances, should the administrative court annul the decision refus-
ing to accept Renata solely because she did not have a master’s degree in preferred 
areas?
Medication HIGH
According to the law, the National Health Fund only covers the cost of those medi-
cations that are listed on the Reimbursed Drugs List. Other drugs can be reimbursed 
only after approval by the Minister of Health. Should administrative courts annul 
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final decisions by the Minister of Health denying the reimbursement of non-listed 
drugs if they are necessary to cure specific individuals?
Medication MID
A person needs to undergo an expensive pharmacological therapy. The required 
drug is not listed on the Reimbursed Drugs List. According to the law, the National 
Health Fund covers the cost of only those medications that are listed. Other drugs 
can be reimbursed only after approval by the Minister of Health. Without public 
money, this person does not have sufficient funds to afford to purchase the drug. The 
Minister of Health denied the reimbursement.
Because of that, the person filed a complaint against the final decision denying 
the reimbursement of the drug.
Should the administrative court annul the decision by the Minister of Health in 
such circumstances?
Medication LOW
Łucja, a 57-year old woman from Podgórze, was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease 
and is in need of an expensive drug known under the trade name of “Fampyra”. The 
drug is not listed on the Reimbursed Drugs List. According to the law, the National 
Health Fund covers the cost of only these medications that are listed. Other drugs 
can be reimbursed only after approval by the Minister of Health. Without public 
money, Łucja does not have sufficient funds to afford to purchase the drug. The Min-
ister of Health denied the reimbursement.
Because of that, Łucja filed a complaint against the final decision denying the 
reimbursement of the drug.
Should the administrative court annul the decision by the Minister of Health in 
such circumstances?
Little person HIGH
People can make life choices that are considered to be detrimental to themselves or 
to interfere with their honor. Such people voluntarily undergo humiliation but they 
don’t infringe other people’s rights. Keeping in mind the principle of human dignity, 
should public authorities restrict such people from making such choices?
Little person MID
Some bars organize dwarf-tossing contests. A dwarf has freely and clearly expressed 
their will to be tossed and was employed by a given bar to participate in such con-
test. During a competition, the dwarf is tossed by two teams. Dwarfs receive appro-
priate remuneration and use equipment guaranteeing lack of any physical harm. 
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Such contests cheer up a place: patrons have fun at the expense of the dwarf and 
establishments which provide such entertainment are never empty.
In one of the cities in which dwarf-tossing is a popular pastime, the City Coun-
cil passed a decision—under a necessary statutory authorization—prohibiting such 
activities as interfering with public morals by humiliating the involved dwarfs.
One of dwarfs employed in such capacity filed a complaint against the decision 
to the court. Should the administrative court (having in mind the principle of protec-
tion of human dignity) annul the City Council decision under such circumstances?
Little person LOW
Some bars in Kraków organize dwarf-tossing contests. Grzegorz is a dwarf that has 
freely and clearly expressed his will to be tossed and was employed by a bar on 
Grodzka Street. During competitions, Grzegorz is tossed by two teams, he receives 
appropriate remuneration and uses equipment guaranteeing lack of any physical 
harm. The team that throws Grzegorz furthest wins the competition. Such contests 
cheer up the place: patrons lift Grzegorz, throw him, and have fun at his expense. 
Establishments providing such entertainment, including the bar where Grzegorz is 
tossed, are never empty.
The City Council of Kraków passed a decision—under a necessary statutory 
authorization—prohibiting such activities as interfering with public morals by 
humiliating involved dwarfs.Grzegorz filed a complaint against the decision to the 
court. Should the administrative court (having in mind the principle of protection of 
human dignity) annul the City Council decision under such circumstances?
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